Provided by Raúl M (Tigre)

From "Infantry behind the lines – still a viable concept". Major Mike McMahon, Infantry. School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


On 22 June, 1941, the German Army attacked Russia The German offensive was initially very successful in terms of tempo and distance covered. Whole Russian armies were annihilated by German encirclement operations. However, the cost of maintaining the momentum necessary for successful large-scale encirclement operations was that the Germans by passed large areas which could not be easily traversed.

During pre-war exercises, the Soviet General Staff had realized that they could not stop the German armored spearheads near the border. They decided, therefore, on a strategy of delay in order to separate the attacking armor from the supporting infantry formations. They would then deal with each group separately with their operational echelon in the interior of western Ukraine. Integral to this strategy was the insertion of small infantry and cavalry forces in the German rear areas to disrupt the lines of communication and further the separation of the armor from infantry formations. (1)

The 32nd Russian Cossack Division was assigned the mission of disrupting the rear areas of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center, which was continuing the attack towards Smolensk and Moscow. To insert the force in the rear of the Germans, the Cossacks hid in the Pripet Marshes until the attacking German formations passed them by. Mobility in the Pripet Marshes was extremely limited, with only a few small trails crossing the otherwise swampy terrain. In addition to the difficult terrain, coordinated German operations in the area were difficult because the Pripet Marshes were the boundary between Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South and Bock's Army Group North. By mid-July the Soviet forces north of the Pripet Marshes had been encircled and were being reduced, and on 11 July Colonel General Heinz Guderian's Panzer Group 2 was crossing the Dnepr River. This was the trigger for the 32nd Cossack Division to go into action. (2)

The 32nd Russian Cossack Division was organized with four troops of about 100 soldiers each, and a three-gun artillery battery. The Cossacks were reinforced by other Russian soldiers who had escaped from the German encirclement and taken refuge in the swamps of the Pripet Marshes. In all, the division was approximately 750 men strong. The Cossacks provided themselves with horses and a few vehicles found in the area, thus making the division tactically mobile. They were supplied with a large amount of explosives, and were resupplied to a limited extent by air. Most supplies, however, came from foraging, which was difficult, given the limited sustainment capacity of the Pripet Marshes. Indeed, one captured Cossack told his captors that he had survived for weeks by eating nothing but tree bark. Orders came via couriers, who either infiltrated through the German lines dressed as civilians, or parachuted. (3) This obviated the need for long range communications systems.

Upon being ordered to begin disruption operations, the 32nd Cossack Division moved from the Pripet Marshes north into the area west of Bobriusk, which was mostly marshy and forested. Once in this critical sector of the German lines of communications they destroyed road and railway bridges, mined the German supply routes, and ambushed German supply columns and courier vehicles. Occasionally they attacked the supply trains. During the day the Cossacks stayed hidden, sending patrols out for security as well as intelligence gathering. The patrols, dressed in peasant garb, reconnoitered and marked routes for use by raiding forces at night. They made good use of the local populace as an intelligence source, though at this point in the war the population was not totally friendly to the Cossacks.

Widely dispersed in hide positions, the Cossacks assembled upon signal by red flare, and began operations. Action was continuous throughout the night, placing a heavy burden on the reactive German command and control system and on the morale and physical readihess of the German soldiers. The Cossacks' actions reflected detailed coordination and intelligence work. Usually, their operations were characterized by dispersed acts of sabotage, though they were always synchronized against the same type target However, when a large supply train was due, the Russians combined for large-scale raids, with a few small outlying actions to divert attention from the main - effort. Just before dawn the Cossacks dispersed to new hide positions .to rest and prepare for the next night's action. (4)

The most effective tactic employed by the Cossacks was laying well-camoflagued mines on the primary roads and railroads. This not only destroyed many supply vehicles and rail engines and cars, but disrupted the flow of traffic while German mineclearing squads swept the roads every morning. The Cossacks were innovative in quickly developing methods to counter German defensive measures, and were continually successful in significantly disrupting the flow of material in the area. This had significant effects on Army Group Center's Ninth Army, which, due to disruptions in their sipply lines, had to delay further offensives in support of Guderian's Panzer Group 2's attack toward Smolensk. (5)

The Germans' initial response to the actions of the 32nd Cossacks was to detail the 87th Infantry Division, which was the Ninth Army reserve, to reinforce security detachments along the railroads. However, this merely caused the Cossacks to shift tactics. The Cossacks alternated between widely dispersed acts of small sabotage and coordinated attacks on the security detachments. Realizing that these reactive tactics could not be successful, the 87th Infantry Division was ordered in the beginning of August to neutralize the enemy in the area by seeking out and destroying them. The commander of the 187th Infantry Regiment, assigned this task, decided to encircle the enemy and destroy them completely in one operation." Success depended on responsive and accurate intelligence to pinpoint the Cossack's location.

The Cossacks discovered the German plan and began exfiltrating from the area toward the east. On 5 August they attempted to break out of the area as a combined unit. This made them much easier for the Germans to track. The Germans reacted rapidly and positioned blocking forces to prevent further escape of the Cossacks. The Cossacks then
tried to escape to the south back into the Pripet Marshes. In their attempt they exposed themselves and the Germans reacted quickly to encircle them by 6 August. The encircling German forces then began to collapse the pocket. The resulting close combat was fierce, requiring the use of hand grenades and bayonets, since mortars and machine
guns had little effect in the thick forest. Throughout the night of 6-7 August, the Cossacks attacked repeatedly in their attempts to break out. But since they were dispersed, these attacks were disjointed and rarely effective. The Cossacks collapsed their positions into a tight defensive enclave and fought until their annihilation by midday on 7 August Very few made it out of the cordon, and even fewer returned to Russian lines. (7)

The operations of the 32nd Cossack Division were successful in disrupting the supply lines of the German forward forces, and thereby delaying their advance. This permitted the Russian operational echelon to regroup around Smolensk and buy enough time for the strategic reserve to be formed and deployed to launch the counteroffensive forward of Moscow. Additionally, the Cossacks tied down reserve forces that could have been otherwise employed in support of the German offensive.

Though not the only cause of the Germans' operational pause before continuing the attack toward Smolensk, the Cossacks actions show that the interdiction of the operational lines of communications of the enemy can have a significant impact on the enemy's operations. The cost to the 32nd Cossack Division was significant, with virtually all of the 750 soldiers of the division destroyed. Several observations from the experience of the 32nd Cossack Division are relevant to the current analysis. First, during World War Two, large units could hide in untrafficable terrain and avoid the enemy during his assault through the area. These units could then emerge into the less dense (in terms of combat forces) area behind the enemy front lines. Second, direct attacks of the enemy's combat forces were near suicidal for the Russians. The Cossacks were successful in evading detection as long as they operated through sabotage and mining, and were less successful when they launched large-scale raids.

Further, the Cossacks were able to avoid detection as long as they operated as dispersed small units. There were two advantages to this mode of operations. There was a greater level of confusion on the part of the German command because they could not know the size of the forces operating against them. Additionally, they portrayed a number of small targets for the Germans, which were inherently more difficult to find and track than a large unit was. Once the Cossacks combined to attempt the breakout, they were easy to find and could not escape in the face of overwhelming German combat power. Finally, the Cossacks made good use of the local populace for security and intelligence. The locals provided excellent intelligence about the activities of the Germans so that targeting could be planned.

Footnotes

1. Bryan I. Fugate, Operation Barbarossa (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984), 46. ,
2. E Bergen, "Encirclement and Annihilation of the Russian 32d Cossack Division 6-7 August, 1941," Historical Manuscript #D-075 (Office of the Chief of Military History, Headquarters, European Command, 25 April, 1947), 6 and 22-23.
3. Bergen, 4 and 22-23.
4. Bergen, 6-8.
5. Bergen, 7-9.
6. Bergen, 10-11.
7. Bergen, 18-22